

Introduction

Toward Contexts More Intricate and Subtle

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We need to embrace, in the place of mere realism, a more robust and complex view of the world, what we might call meta-realism, which recognizes a context more intricate and subtle than we had hoped would be necessary, that also takes into account some values, beliefs, wishes and hopes that are completely unrealistic.

Charles L. Mee, Jr.

The above quotation is set at the conclusion of Branimir Anzulovic's *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*, and fittingly describes the kind of thought and action necessary for approaching contexts where ethnic differences become violent. The book you hold in your hands, *Perspectives on Contemporary Ethnic Conflict*, helps give birth to the "meta-realism" so needed, an approach to ethnic conflict that refuses the simplifications built of easy polarities, of mono-causal theories, or from characterizations of human groups formed on centuries of stereotype. It looks at some of the most conflictive sites in the world, where ethnic violence has been created and played out: Burma, Indonesia, India, Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria, the Sudan, Mexico, Guyana. As contributors to this volume

make abundantly clear, when careful analysis is made of these settings, the many forms of “mere realism” built from received analytic distinctions and categories about international reality fall away, just as do the simplifying ideals about “the nature of the human” or about “the nature” of this or that group.

A Call for a Meta-Realism

Western powers today need especially to hear this call to a meta-realism, still steeped as they are in the legacies of their colonizations abroad, evidenced by the way British and French empires still structure their relations to the present global developments, and by their histories of repression regarding those within their borders thought to be ethnically different. The several centuries of discrimination and oppression of non-white groups in the United States, also pull its leaders and scholars into the ranks of those who need this book, who would benefit from the greater complexity of its meta-realistic context.

Note that Mee suggests that such a meta-realism involves also a study of the *unrealistic* values and beliefs of people, and the power those can hold. A complex analysis is one that honors the power of the *unrealistic* myths as they often work to deadly effect amid the play of many other factors – economic, political, social. So it is that for understanding the strife of the Balkans in the late 20th century, we needed studies like Anzulovic’s on the national myth of “Greater Serbia,” as well as those that throw focus on the way economic matters drove the conflict.¹ Moreover, these myths exist not just between those who are studied by Western leaders and scholars – the “primordial others” caught up in cycles of violence. No, they exist also among those who claim to stand back and do the analyzing in the name of an allegedly more civilized way.

British Prime Minister John Major, for example, uttered these words about the conflict in the Balkans of the 1980s and 1990s.

The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that that exerted over *the ancient hatreds* in the old Yugoslavia. Once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred.²

Just as simplistic myths often drive the actual perpetrators of violence, so they drive observers of it like Major, who revealed also his myth, especially in his discourse of “the ancient hatreds.” Major is not a lone example. Especially when talking about the Balkans, a host of political leaders and media pundits made recourse to the “ancient ethnic hatreds” interpretation of conflict in ethnically conflicted settings. Such interpretation often serves as a way to rationalize the presence of conflict stemming from past external interventions and dominance

by great powers (colonialism, foreign invasion), and throws the fault back onto those who suffer it directly.

Not just national leaders like Prime Minister Major are steeped in this mythic tendency to project mythic violence outward and away from the “civilized” group, onto others who use myth for violence. Against the backdrop of a still prevalent white racism in the United States, the popular culture of that nation’s people frequently show similar tendencies. In the wake of the social trauma resulting from Hurricane Katrina, for example, the urban poor who suffered the brunt of displacement were often referred to, as on a popular radio station in New Jersey, as “those people,” groups who don’t know how to get out of the way, or who “only know how to be served by the welfare state, unable to help themselves.” Many other potential examples are legion, especially if we were to examine the values and beliefs of other nations, too.

Complexity and Care

If we attain to a more complex “meta-realism,” this is not driven only by a scholastic worship of complexity and intricacy. The careful attentiveness to the complexity of diverse factors carries and expresses also a moral concern. Among many scholars, especially those who wish to mask or bracket the moral quandaries that attend their own socially-located knowledge, there is a kind of fetishizing of complexity that ever defers questions of moral care and discernment. That is not the approach of contributors to this collection. True, there are no quick moral judgments, and moral reflection is not brought to the fore. Nevertheless, navigating the complexities of the political traumas examined here suggests in numerous ways that a care for the well-being of the sufferers—as they strive for peace, justice, human rights, and democracy—is always close at hand. At times, too, the contributors will reflect on what might move parties in conflict toward redress or alleviation.

The connection to moral concern is evident in Mee’s and Anzulovic’s way of developing the call to complexity: “This meta-realism might finally be indistinguishable from the elusive and contradictory tenets of ethics, which are, finally no more nor less than the accumulated practical folk wisdom of millennia of human experience.”³ In other words, the meta-realist approach is no hiding from the decisions and expressions of moral perspective that conflict often generates. We might say that the study of the complexity of how worlds of conflicts are formed, aids in the study of how worlds of conflict ought to be redressed, mitigated. In other terms, an all too rare, careful attentiveness to complexity is a way to care for the trauma, injustice, wrenching and extensive pain generated by what is so frequently rendered “ethnic conflict.” Meta-realism, to recall the words of Mee above, enables the forming of not just esoteric scholarly jargon, but the emergence of a practical human (“folk”) wisdom, a knowledge of complexity that might serve justice and peace.

At the outset here, it is no doubt important to stress that in this book's study, a moral concern to care and redress is rooted in the extensive waste and loss of humanity that forms the backdrop of these studies. The nearly 1 million killed and 2 million uprooted in Rwanda of 1994 is one dramatic case. This book also attends to the 300,000 (mostly Hutus) killed in Burundi; the 500,000 refugees of the military regime of Burma, and the 600,000 internally displaced there as well; the one million lives lost in the Biafran war with Nigeria, the genocide that the U.S. congress has named as ongoing in Darfur of the Sudan, and more. These, though, are large numbers and broad terms for designating the human terror of this violence. The contributors here press beyond the statistics and overviews, and often engage the stories and details, the individual struggles of those who face the impoverishment, the vulnerability to rape, the unrelenting travail of war, the routine torture, and the indignities of occupation. A human care, a moral concern asking about the good of those in suffering, depends on the caring attention to detail.

Critical Exercises in Meta-Realism

The careful analyses of each essayist in this volume offer the surest route into the meta-realism we need deploy for studying the trauma named "ethnic violence." The essays are grouped into two major Parts, one focusing on explaining the sources and dynamics of ethnic violence, the other focusing primarily on descriptions of regional ethnic conflict across the globe. Readers should be prepared, though, to find this boundary between explanation and description not to be a firm one; for along the way of explaining the cases of violence in Part 1, there are discussions rich in the texture of description, and amid the portraits given in the Part 2 readers will also find gems to aid in scholars' work of explanation.

Even though the readers' journey through these essays, singly and collectively, is the surest route for grasping this book's contribution to meta-realist complexity, I suggest that we can fill out this Introduction with a series of critical exercises through which readers will journey as they confront the essays. Each of the critical exercises I present here involve key distinctions between two terms or ideas, which this book's writers both acknowledge but then render more complex. In presenting these critical exercises as I do, I presume that not all binary thinking is problematic; rather, the challenge is to enable a multiplicity of binary perspectives to prompt analysis that transcends the confines of binaristic thinking, perhaps to the point of shaking free from the chains of binarism that have structured so much academic and popular discourse about "ethnic violence." I stress that no one, or even only several, of the critical exercises I name below constitute a meta-realist approach to study of social conflict involving ethnic identity. Instead, all of them together, along with still other blurred distinctions made by scholars of violence, will be needed.

1. Contesting “Primordial” and “Constructionist” Explanations

With this first distinction, we can see that the explanatory structure of social science inquiries into ethnic violence, has often been embedded in the very problematic of “ancient ethnic heritages” that we discussed at the outset of this Introduction. The mythic simplifications of political leaders and popular writers about the Balkans conflict have been reformulated in traditions of scholarly analysis. The “primordialists,” for example, approximate the process of mythic projection when they interpret group tendencies toward conflict as rooted in the make-up or character of a group. In this way of explanation, the group is often “essentialized” as problematic when it is seen in conflict with others, i.e. it is interpreted as having an essence that is conflict prone in some way.

The “constructivists” tend to reject scholars’ primordialist explanations as no explanation at all. Saha, in his essay here, for example, sees it only as a kind of labeling. Other writers in this text would seem to agree. Constructivists place the emphasis on the creations of history, society, economy and politics, as at work in the agency of specific groups and individuals as the material for explaining violence between groups. These creations also are the material from which the very category of “ethnicity” itself is derived, and from which different kinds of ethnic identity are forged. In short, constructivists begin with an assumption that not only is “ethnic conflict” an activity constructed from the particularities and vicissitudes of history, also the very notions of “ethnic” and “ethnicity” are interpreted as constructions.

While most of the contributors here lean toward the constructivist side of this distinction, in keeping with the meta-realism we broached at the beginning of this Introduction, scholars here are hardly satisfied with defining the field of analysis only in those two terms. They go beyond it in two ways. First, and most obviously, they insist on considering other approaches to studies of ethnic violence: “instrumentalist,” “consociational,” and so on. The study of ethnic violence, in other words, is not just a matter of positioning constructivist studies over against primordialist ones. There are other types of study as well. Second, these scholars also respect the point made by Anzulovic and Mee that there is a seed of insight in the primordialist sensibility, in that overtime some groups have projected certain myths (about other groups and about themselves) and then have sought to live into them. This is to say, for all those myths’ constructiveness, those who live into them give them a certain power that shapes history and enables scholars to anticipate certain probabilities. It is just this that the primordialists often seize upon in their stereotypes and labeling. This insight, however, can be accommodated within a meta-realist perspective that factors it in as but one dynamic element within the fuller and more complex set of constructivist approaches. Most writers here, for example, will study the way certain groups, such as the Hutus of Rwanda, have internalized certain myths about themselves and others from the colonial past which when routinized and lived out over time yield some predictive patterns of violence. But that potential for gauging future probabilities does not fall back into primordialist theory. The

emphasis in the meta-realist approach falls on the process of creating and internalizing the myths that come to have power. Readers do well to watch how these scholars work the primordialist/constructivist distinction in their treatments.

2. Moving Beyond Multi-causal and Mono-causal Analyses

From the foregoing it should be obvious that readers should also expect contributors to be bringing to bear a multiplicity of factors and causes that create and shape conflict and violence. A meta-realist perspective entails a multi-causal analysis. The complexities of constructed conditions that yield violence also predispose these scholars to multi-causal treatments.

This being acknowledged, readers will find it important to track the particular trajectories of explanation that the various authors tend to privilege in presenting their material. In other terms, we might say this: granted that there are a multiplicity of causes, the various situations examined by these writers lead them to raise certain analytic strategies of analysis to prominence. Some writers, for example, will highlight material conditions (realities of draught, scarcity of food, and so on), while others will throw a spotlight on the function of religious ideologies for defining who is within an approved group or entity, and who is not. Some writers, such as Magnarella in chapter 4 on Rwanda, will seek to sort out ultimate causes from proximate causes of ethnic conflict. The specificities of context, as probed by the book's contributors, do not ever yield a mono-causal treatment, but nor is the range of analyses simply a multi-causal free for all. Analytic decisions are made and certain factors among many are developed to explain and describe the scene at hand. Readers will be invited to gauge how writers limit multi-causality without resorting to mono-causal explanations.

3. Fusing Present and Past Horizons of Analysis (a Postcolonial Sensibility)

Nearly all of these contributors work with a sense of history. Indeed, to explore with any adequacy the strife and trauma at their sites, this is inevitable. The majority of these sites are hotbeds traceable to the tumult of their colonized pasts. Rwanda and Burundi are treated in relation to French and Belgian colonizers, Nigeria and India in relation to British rule, the Sudan in relation to Arabized, Islamized, as well as British rule. Even though not many of the writers style their analyses as "postcolonial" (Manian writes of "postcolonial Guyana, Wee and Lang of "post-colonial developmentalism"), they all are analyzing strife in the burned-over districts of empire's colonial projects.

The result is that the temporal horizons of these analyses float back and forth between past and present horizons. I deploy the notion of "fusion" for this interplay of horizons, in the sense of the hermeutical writings of H.G. Gadamer. This fusion is not a merger, in which the difference between past and present is lost, but an interplay of perspective, where a shuttling between past and present paradigms for viewing, is allowed to create more nuanced treatments of the contexts of violence. There is not here the kind of ethnography that abstracts society and groups from the flow of history, nor is there a historical plotting of events

that ignores social forces and dynamics of present groups and their relations. No, nearly all contributors view their contacts through the lens of a historical analysis as well as through more sociological and political ones. The need to look at present ethnic violence, say in Nigeria and the Sudan, in relation to the past is especially evident given the way past decisions by colonizing powers, to carve up and draw new boundaries for “independent” nations, still haunt the attempts of so many cultural groups to live together today.

Since so many of these sites are previously colonized ones, this means that the analyses here dwell in that curious state of “the postcolonial”—a time and space “after” the colonial regime, “after” decolonization and independence, hence “post”-colonial, and yet not really “post-” in the sense of being free from the past conditions that are carried in groups and beliefs of the present. Add in various forms of neocolonialism and contemporary militarist and imperialist moves of powerful nations like the United States, and the “post-” in postcolonial does not seem “post-” at all, except in the less temporal sense of a quality or intention to struggle against, so as to move beyond, the constraints of colonial legacies. So, even if those famous rituals and events of “independence” did occur—in the 1940s through 1960s for African and Asian nations (and much earlier in the “decolonization” of Latin America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries)—the influence of the colonial past fuses itself into the social politics of the present. Given the prominence of the colonial heritage in making for conflict, and remembering Jürgen Osterhammel’s insight that European and U.S. racism was “the ultimate version of the difference axiom” for the colonizing neocolonizing empires,⁴ one might even interpret the violence stemming from legacies of the colonizer’s policies as another form of “ethnic violence.” From a full historical perspective on the present, it is not quite right to characterize as “ethnic violence” what occurs within small, newly independent states. Ethnic violence can also name the colonizing violence of epochs and empires, past and present.

4. Distinguishing Ethnic Differentiation and Ethnic Violence

We come here to another distinction, which is preserved, but then complexified and transcended in the meta-realist analyses of this book. Again, as with the previous pairs of terms, the contributors are careful not to collapse these two notions into one another. Not all ethnic differentiation leads on to ethnic violence. Groups with long constructed and nurtured identities have often lived together in zones that today are often depicted as predominantly conflictual. In the Balkan regions, for example, there was the impressive degree of toleration, indeed celebration, of different ethnic identities in Sarajevo and Belgrade.

Both notions, though—ethnic differentiation and ethnic violence—interact in this volume. As Vivienne Wee and Graeme Lang make clear, the research on ethnic violence brings together two others in the social sciences, “two largely non-intersecting literatures—studies of ethnic conflict and studies of political violence.”⁵ It is another example of the working of the perspective of the book,

its meta-realism, it's taking on of complexity that engages a surplus of perspectives beyond what before has been taken as "real" about violence, conflict and ethnicity. Indeed, readers will begin to unravel much of the richness of the book's offerings simply by tracing the many ways authors here theoretically relate ethnic differentiation to ethnic violence. What *are* the differences at work and how have they been constructed? Is the construction of the relevant ethnicity itself a condition for the violence? Is construction of ethnic identity itself a kind of violence of its own? If it is not itself a violence, is it just "a difference" of human culture or practice? What factors lead differentiated ethnic groups to transition into violent conflict? These are all questions that emerge and are addressed for readers as contributors here explore the intersections between ethnic differentiation and ethnic violence.

5. Examining Ethnic Identity and the Politics of Race

Readers coming from outside the social science literature, but with a strong interest in the study of ethnic differentiation and violence, may need to be reminded of what for some time has become an axiom of studies of ethnicity. Ethnicity is not race. Ethnic differences, to be studied in all their fullness, need to break free from the strictures of the notion of race/races. Social science's freedom from scientific racism, a hard won and at times still continuing struggle, has meant establishing this difference between ethnicity and race. Human groups' genetic features and social existence do not correspond to the differentiations projected as races by racist standpoints, whether the crass hierarchies set out by scholars like Johann Blumenbach in 1795 ("Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American and Malayan")⁶ or other political projections that have occurred since then.

Exemplary of the difference between ethnicity and race, is Hintjens' and Kiyuwa's treatment of conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda since the 1994 genocide. They portray "ethnic identity" (recall, always a complexly constructed notion) as different from "the politics of race." Racialized politics is defined by them as a "reading people's identities and social status off their position," a position in post-genocidal Rwanda usually set by people's experience of the 1994 events of genocide. The "post-" in post-genocidal is as ambiguous, if also as necessary, as the notion of the "post-colonial." The major point to observe here is that the scholar of the complexity that is Rwanda must navigate both the dynamics of ethnic differentiation and of the politics of race. However interconnected – and they are in a sundry and multileveled ways – they are not to be confused. In fact, as Hintjens and Kiyuwa suggest toward the end of their essay, peace and democratic growth in Rwanda will depend on the extent to which its citizens are able to forge ethnic and political identities that are free from the politics of race (free from, for example, the categorization of one's identity as "Hutu," as "Tutsi"). They point to some hopeful signs in the form of "more complex perspectives on political identity" that move beyond the Hutu-Tutsi divide. Even in some of the official categories used by national authorities

since the genocide (“survivors and *genocidaires*, new and old caseload refugees, rural and urban Rwandans, Anglophone and Francophone”) there is a cross-cutting of the binaristic racial politics. When one factors in, as Hintjens and Kiwuwa do, other dynamics stemming from class, region, politics and religion, then the potential for constructing ethnic identity outside the politics of race, and so creating a more livable and democratic politics, becomes greater. With these complexities the “meta-realist” analytic comes to full flower. At the same time, the meta-realist’s dimension of care, which laces the meta-realist care-full attention to complexity with moral interest, suggests the ethical aspect of meta-realist analyses of sites like that of Rwanda.

6. Linking ethnicity and politics

In the previous section we raised the question of politics, though largely in relation to the politics of race. This, though, is just one way in which the notions of ethnicity in these articles on ethnic violence will intersect with politics. Readers should prepare to examine the many complexities of the book’s meta-realist analysis, in so far as they link ethnicity and politics as determinative forces in situations of violence.

What is meant by these two terms? It might be helpful to suggest at the outset here that “ethnicity” can be seen more as a marking term, a way to designate groups and persons that are in some way different from others with whom they relate. “Politics,” on the other hand, designates the way power is dispersed between marked groups, by way of either the more positive practices of power-sharing, compromise and mutual support, or through more negative practices of dominance, repression, marginalization and exclusion. Often the political options are very complex amalgams ranging between these positive and negative political options.

There is an added complication, however, which will be brought to light by the following studies. Even though it is true that ethnically marked groups can be studied with a view to the play of powers in their contexts, the very marking process that produces the ethnic group’s political experience is itself a process that is political. This need not be lamented as a vicious theoretical circle. It simply calls attention to the fact that ethnicity, and the ways ethnicity is marked in different settings, is not only studied as having present and future political consequences but also as always already a consequence of past political conditions. The marking of ethnic identity shapes politics, even as ethnic marking is shaped by politics. Nearly all the essays of the volume are cognizant of this complexity and readers are invited to compare the various ways this complex circle between ethnicity and politics is played out across the different contributions.

7. Focusing Material Conditions and Ethnic Conflict

This dynamic of interaction in the book concerns perhaps another way that politics intersects ethnicity. If politics is about the dispersal of power (shared, dominative, exclusive, et al) the question of material conditions raises the ques-

tion of power in a more specific way. Here, the focus falls on infrastructural considerations of geography, ecological habitat, availability of resources, and the way the production of life-sustaining resources are made available (or not) to the various groups that share, or are contingent to, specific material ecospheres or bioregional sets of circumstances.

Nearly all the authors acknowledge the importance of material conditions, if only in their tracing the locations of the groups they study, describing habitat and climate of the worlds involved. This remains true even for those whose primary interest falls on other factors, i.e. myths and beliefs projected onto groups that cause conflict, or an “oppression psychosis” borne by certain groups. Some, such as Magnarella, will make a comparatively stronger case for the determinative role of material conditions in ethnic conflict. After acknowledging the many interpretations of what caused the Rwandan genocidal conflict between Hutus and Tutsis, he lists most of these as “proximate causes,” with the “ultimate cause” proposed as “the increasing imbalance in land, food, and people that led to malnutrition, hunger, periodic famine, and fierce competition for land to farm.” Magnarella sees this as not just a problem in Rwanda, but of the wider area of East Africa of which Rwanda is one part. This regional focus prompts one to consider, again, the legacy of colonialism in helping to create the shortages and conflicts that arise over so wide an area. The impact of colonialism on material conditions of ethnic conflict are also evident in Nigeria, as Bangura makes clear in chapter 6 when summarizing how the British colonizers’ arbitrary drawing of lines across African land and space, making these into boundaries of national power, threw multifaceted ethnic groups into sudden and problematic proximity so that nation-building was a struggle, if not, often, an impossibility.

Readers should not expect to find here a material determinism with respect to ethnic violence, one that always and only privileges dynamics leading from theories of material conditions to ethnic conflict. Even Magnarella’s strong case for material conditions as ultimate cause in Rwanda, situates that causality in relation to a set of important proximate causes. When reading the other contributors as well, one can attend to the role that is given to material determinants in the meta-realist perspective of writers and in the meta-realist perspective set in place by the book as a whole.

8. Considering Ethnic Violence and State Legitimacy

Beginning with this point and concluding with the next, I highlight two conjunctions within meta-realist analysis that lean a bit more toward the ethical dimension of that analysis. That is to say, without losing their analytic value, analyses here also carry a moral interest, if only in the care they signal when contemplating improvement of situations of trauma, whether this is Nigeria, the Sudan, Indonesia, Burma, India, Kurdistan, southern Mexico (Chiapas), or elsewhere. That care, this moral interest, is not quite an “emancipatory interest” that the early Jürgen Habermas and others often find nestled in the tangled interstices

of scientific inquiry's *a priori* assumptions,⁷ but it is an "alleviatory interest," a concern constituting an ethical dimension of meta-realist analysis, a concern to mitigate and redress the trauma of violence contexts fraught with dynamics of ethnicity. This moral or alleviatory interest often seems to function as a final cause or lure as analysts unfold their descriptions and explanations.

The first conjunction of this sort lies in the occasional but steady interest of writers to examine the relationship between ethnic violence and state legitimacy. State legitimacy refers to the presence of a strong state that invites and commands the consent of groups in potential or actual conflict. Wee and Lang lay out the connection early on with their discussions of how ethnic violence tends to break out when "state legitimacy is fragile." So intimate for them are the connections between ethnic differentiation and political conflict, on the one hand, and state legitimacy on the other hand, that they plea that we "understand ethnic differentiation and nation-making as social phenomena situated at different points of the same political spectrum."⁸ Again, there is no reduction of ethnic differentiation to nation-building, nor of nation-building to mere managing of ethnic differences, but the two major processes are intricately connected.

Readers will see contributors considering this relation in various national contexts—in the search for a state to prevent future replays of genocide in Rwanda and Burundi, in the struggle for power-sharing and compromises necessary for a legitimate state to emerge in the Sudan, or in the quest for a less corrupted leadership in state functions of Nigeria. The contributors' interests in state formation to alleviate ethnic violence is evident among the book, whether they focus on the development-states working within the dominant globalization paradigm (G7 nations implementing and enforcing agendas of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank),⁹ or they focus on more innovative nation-building aims by way of postcolonial people's movements that cut against the grain of current globalization structures, as in the Zapatista struggle of Chiapas that Hall explores, in the Nigerian women's movements challenging oil corporations, or in the movements of postcolonial Guyana that Manian analyzes.

One result of this attention to nation-building as site for potentially alleviating or redressing ethnic conflict is that readers are given a diversity of viewpoints on the nation-building process, and may even be led to consider new notions of just what a "nation" is. This, in turn, may be preparatory for considering the challenge laid down by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in their books *Empire* and *Multitude*, in which they argue that the very notion of nation, and the nationalism that goes with it, are often so problematic that the nation-state cannot really function as a lasting remedy to emancipate peoples from trauma and group conflict.¹⁰ Both the variety of nation-building operations and dissatisfaction with nation-state politics and nationalism, may turn the ethical interests of meta-realist analysis toward more expansive regional and global polities for redressing ethnic violence.

9. Studying Third-Party and Other Intervention and Ethnic Violence

The turning of attention to regional and global matrices of analysis, mentioned just above, is also evident in this book's attentiveness to "third-party" or other external interventions into given sites of ethnic conflict. The most sustained example of this is in the opening essay by Ghose and James, which offers a systemic framework for examining third-party intervention in ethnic conflict. Indeed, the intricate conceptual structure of this first essay may make the most demands upon readers, but it is exemplary of the complexity that this entire Introduction has attributed to the meta-realist approach to ethnic differentiation and conflict, which becomes all the more complex when one adds the study of intervention strategies and impact. Ghose and James test their framework in relation to Pakistan's intervention into Kashmir in 1965, and then to India's intervention in Sri Lanka.

The interest in intervention is evident in a number of other essays. It is taken up by Bangura in analyzing Nigerian conflict, is implied in Magnarella's focusing on the material need of the whole area of East Africa that calls for regional and global organizations' work of economic relief, and in Edozie's considerations of UN and U.S. failures to intervene forthrightly in the unfolding genocide of Darfur in the Sudan. Intervention is not the only mode of alleviation considered by the book's contributors, but it is a recurring motif that most contributors point to, regarding the many sites of postcolonial experiment they analyze, enabling them to express what Edozie refers to in her essay title as a "democratic route to peace." The book may hold lessons on intervention especially for the powerful G7 countries that have powers to intervene. It may clarify what genuine alleviative intervention is, as distinct from interference rooted in powerful nation's self-interests, or it may suggest models for bridging between effective alleviative intervention and nationally self-interested intervention. The record of intervention by powerful nation-states, especially by the United States, is not good. As Samantha Fox wrote after her journalistic experience in the Balkans and from the perspective of her work and studies at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, "The United States had never in its history intervened to stop genocide and had in fact rarely even made a point of condemning it as it occurred," until it made its belated response to the Bosnia genocide in the 1990s.¹¹

The moral interest provoked by genocide and by other political traumas born from group interaction, and also the knowledge interests that become so exceedingly complex when we turn to what is called "ethnic violence" – both the moral interests and the knowledge interests, I suggest, call forward the kind of meta-realist perspective and analysis forged by this volume. The book's contributors and editors would be among the first to admit that not all the complexities surface in their works. Many necessary issues and complexities, however, are indeed broached in this volume, even if this Introduction has been only able to scratch the surface. The nine "critical exercises" discussed briefly in this section of the Introduction are offered more as portals through which readers might

look out onto the complex sea of many more distinctions and arguments awaiting attention. The book's greater richness lies before them.

Notes

1. On the role of economics in the Balkans crisis, see Misha Glenny, "So Milosevic Leaves Serbia—and Goes Where?" *The New York Times*, Friday, June 23, 2000, A23, Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*. New, Updated Edition (New York: New York University Press, 1994/1996), xxi. Also Scott Anderson, "The Curse of Blood and Vengeance," *The New York Times Magazine*, December 29, 1999, 29–30. Anderson insists on challenging the frequent talk of "centuries-old ethnic and religious hatreds" with a study of the economic and social conditions of rural groups in relation to urban ones.

2. Cited in Malcolm, xx (emphasis added).

3. Branimir Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myths to Genocide* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 179.

4. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995/2002), 108.

5. Vivienne Wee and Graeme Lang, "Ethnic Violence and the Loss of State Legitimacy: Burma and Indonesia in a Context of Postcolonial Developmentalism," below [first page of their essay].

6. See Stephen Gregory and Roger Sanjek, "The Enduring Inequalities of Race," in Gregory and Sanjek, editors, *Race* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 5.

7. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

8. Wee and Lang, [sentence immediately following section title: "Ethnic violence in two problematic..."]

9. For a helpful description of the "development" pattern of globalization, see Rebecca Todd Peters, *In Search of the Good Life: The Ethics of Globalization* (New York: Continuum, 2004), 70–100. For a critique of the development model, see Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

10. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 109–13.

11. Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), xv.